Grameen Microfinance: An Evaluation of the Successes and Limitations of the Grameen Bank by Moreno, Ana Maria
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Honors Theses Philosophy, Politics and Economics
8-10-2010
Grameen Microfinance: An Evaluation of the
Successes and Limitations of the Grameen Bank
Ana Maria Moreno
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/ppe_honors
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Growth and Development Commons, Income Distribution
Commons, Inequality and Stratification Commons, International Economics Commons, Other
Economics Commons, Political Economy Commons, and the Regional Economics Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/ppe_honors/17
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Moreno, Ana Maria, "Grameen Microfinance: An Evaluation of the Successes and Limitations of the Grameen Bank" (2010). Honors
Theses. Paper 17.
Grameen Microfinance: An Evaluation of the Successes and Limitations of
the Grameen Bank
Abstract
The Grameen Bank has attracted worldwide attention by providing small loans to poor people across rural
villages in Bangladesh. In 2006 the Nobel Committee awarded the Grameen Bank and its founder Professor
Mohammad Yunus the Nobel Peace Prize for their, “efforts to create economic and social development from
below.”[1] The Nobel committee asserted that microfinance is “an important liberating force and an ever more
important instrument in the struggle against poverty.”[2] Since then, a global microfinance revolution has
emerged and the Grameen Bank has been at the vanguard of this movement, showing the potential to alleviate
poverty by providing credit to poor households so that they can generate new self-employment opportunities.
Today, while diverse approaches to microcredit exist many view the Grameen Bank’s microfinance model as a
paradigmatic alternative to top–down government-sponsored and NGO development initiatives.[3] Despite
the contemporary salience and the future promise of Grameen-like microfinance as a poverty-alleviating tool,
however, criticisms and conflicting evidence have emerged against the Grameen Bank’s microfinance model
and its operations. As more microfinance institutions replicate this model, billions of dollars continue to be
invested and millions of borrowers become dependent on Grameen-like microfinance, therefore, it has
become increasingly important to examine the successes and limitations of the Grameen Bank.
The goal of this paper will be to evaluate the Grameen Bank’s financial and social successes and limitations.
Chapter 1 explores the origins of the Grameen Bank and the structure of its credit delivery system. Chapter 2
examines the Grameen Bank’s financial successes, including its institutional, outreach and loan portfolio
growth in recent years. Chapter 3 presents the financial limitations of the Grameen Bank, in particular the
recent rise in delinquency, several possible explanations for this rise as well as its significance relative to its
main competitors and other microfinance institutions around the world. Chapter 4 presents the Grameen
Bank’s social successes and limitations and finally Chapter 5 evaluates whether the Grameen Bank has been
financially and socially successful as an institution and as a leader in the global microfinance movement.
[1] "The Nobel Peace Prize 2006". Nobelprize.org. 23 Jul 2010 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/
laureates/2006/
[2] "Prof. Muhammad Yunus & Grameen Bank Awarded The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006." Grameen Bank.
Web. 15 July 2010. .
[3] Selinger, Evan. Does Microcredit ‘‘Empower’’? Reflections on the Grameen Bank Debate. Rep. Springer
Science+Business Media, 23 Jan. 2008. Web. .
Subject Categories
Asian Studies | Growth and Development | Income Distribution | Inequality and Stratification | International
Economics | Other Economics | Political Economy | Regional Economics
This article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/ppe_honors/17
 
 
 
 Senior Honors Thesis 
 
 
Grameen Microfinance: An Evaluation of the Successes and 
Limitations of the Grameen Bank 
 
Name of Author: Ana Maria Moreno 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Submitted to the Philosophy, Politics and Economics Program at the University of Pennsylvania in 
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Honors.  
 
 
Thesis Advisor: Professor Devesh Kapur  
(dkapur@sas.upenn.edu)  
 
   Date of Submission: August 10 2010                  
 Moreno, 2 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
 
I would like to thank Professor Devesh Kapur for always being patient with his time and generous 
with his advice as he supervised my work. I also greatly appreciate the help that was offered by the 
Penn library.  
 
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my family and friends who have always been very 
supportive throughout my years at Penn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Moreno, 3 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 5 
Chapter 1: The Origins of the Grameen Bank ......................................................................................... 7 
The Grameen Bank and the Beginnings of Microfinance ......................................................................... 7 
Grameen’s Credit Delivery System .......................................................................................................... 9 
Targets the Poorest of the Poor and Focuses on Women ................................................................... 10 
Group, Collateral-free Lending .......................................................................................................... 10 
Rural Banking ..................................................................................................................................... 12 
 Strategy, Risk Management, Growth and Compensation .................................................................. 14 
Chapter 2: Financial Successes of the Grameen Bank .......................................................................... 15 
Institutional Growth ................................................................................................................................ 15 
Outreach Growth ..................................................................................................................................... 17 
Loan Portfolio Growth ............................................................................................................................ 18 
Chapter 3: Financial Limitations of the Grameen Bank ....................................................................... 20 
Decreasing Loan Recovery Rates and Increasing Delinquency ............................................................. 20 
Defaulting Borrowers ......................................................................................................................... 21 
Loan Collection Rate .......................................................................................................................... 21 
Short and Long Run Loan Collection Rates ........................................................................................ 22 
Delinquency ........................................................................................................................................ 23 
Possible Causes of the Decreasing Recovery Rates and Increasing Delinquency .................................. 27 
Adverse Selection ................................................................................................................................ 27 
Concentrated Market Competition and Multiple Borrowing .............................................................. 29 
Over Borrowing .................................................................................................................................. 31 
Economy of Bangladesh ...................................................................................................................... 32 
Chapter 4: Social Successes and Limitations of the Grameen Bank .................................................... 34 
 Moreno, 4 
Sixteen Decisions .................................................................................................................................... 34 
Lending to Women ................................................................................................................................. 36 
Other Social Effects ................................................................................................................................ 38 
Conclusion: The Grameen Bank and the Microfinance Movement ..................................................... 40 
Works Cited ............................................................................................................................................... 42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Moreno, 5 
Introduction 
 
The Grameen Bank has attracted worldwide attention by providing small loans to poor people 
across rural villages in Bangladesh.  In 2006 the Nobel Committee awarded the Grameen Bank 
and its founder Professor Mohammad Yunus the Nobel Peace Prize for their, “efforts to create 
economic and social development from below.” 1  The Nobel committee asserted that 
microfinance is “an important liberating force and an ever more important instrument in the 
struggle against poverty.”2 Since then, a global microfinance revolution has emerged and the 
Grameen Bank has been at the vanguard of this movement, showing the potential to alleviate 
poverty by providing credit to poor households so that they can generate new self-employment 
opportunities.  
Today, while diverse approaches to microcredit exist many view the Grameen Bank’s 
microfinance model as a paradigmatic alternative to top–down government-sponsored and NGO 
development initiatives.3 Despite the contemporary salience and the future promise of Grameen-
like microfinance as a poverty-alleviating tool, however, criticisms and conflicting evidence 
have emerged against the Grameen Bank’s microfinance model and its operations. As more 
microfinance institutions replicate this model, billions of dollars continue to be invested and 
millions of borrowers become dependent on Grameen-like microfinance, therefore, it has 
become increasingly important to examine the successes and limitations of the Grameen Bank. 
                                                          
1 "The Nobel Peace Prize 2006". Nobelprize.org. 23 Jul 2010 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/ 
2 "Prof. Muhammad Yunus & Grameen Bank Awarded The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006." Grameen Bank. Web. 15 July 2010. 
<http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12>. 
3 Selinger, Evan. Does Microcredit ‘‘Empower’’? Reflections on the Grameen Bank Debate. Rep. Springer Science+Business 
Media, 23 Jan. 2008. Web. <http://www.springerlink.com/content/fpm5220tv31h1127/fulltext.pdf>.  
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The goal of this paper will be to evaluate the Grameen Bank’s financial and social successes and 
limitations. Chapter 1 explores the origins of the Grameen Bank and the structure of its credit 
delivery system. Chapter 2 examines the Grameen Bank’s financial successes, including its 
institutional, outreach and loan portfolio growth in recent years. Chapter 3 presents the financial 
limitations of the Grameen Bank, in particular the recent rise in delinquency, several possible 
explanations for this rise as well as its significance relative to its main competitors and other 
microfinance institutions around the world.  Chapter 4 presents the Grameen Bank’s social 
successes and limitations and finally Chapter 5 evaluates whether the Grameen Bank has been 
financially and socially successful as an institution and as a leader in the global microfinance 
movement.   
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Chapter 1: The Origins of the Grameen Bank 
The Grameen Bank and the Beginnings of Microfinance  
 
Access to credit can significantly change the lives of the poor because it provides them with an 
opportunity to invest in self-employment actives and as a result increase their household incomes, 
build assets and reduce their vulnerability to crises. Furthermore, access to credit also has the 
potential to empower and equip the poor to make their own choices and build their way out of 
poverty in a sustained and self-determined way. Finally, it can also make women better able to 
confront gender inequities and ultimately allow them to plan for their future and to invest in their 
own and their families’ health and education.  
Given the significant benefits that access to credit can have on the lives of the poor, before 
institutional credit for the poor was introduced in Bangladesh scarce access to credit inhibited the 
rural poor’s ability to escape the poverty cycle. Prior to the emergence of the Grameen Bank and 
microfinance, commercial banks and moneylenders were the primarily sources of credit available 
in rural Bangladesh, yet both perpetuated the poverty trap.4 On the one hand, commercial banks 
shunned the poor because they were unable to provide collateral, while on the other hand local 
money lenders engaged in extortionary practices, such as charging excessively high rates of 
interests that consumed nearly all of their profits.  
In 1974 the impetus that led to the establishment of the Grameen Bank and its microfinance 
model aimed at providing credit to poor households so that they can generate self-employment 
opportunities emerged during a drought and famine, which killed 1.5 million people in 
                                                          
4 Rahman, Aminur. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh: an Anthropological Study of the Rhetoric and Realities of 
Grameen Bank Lending. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2001. Print. p 4.  
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Bangladesh.5 During the drought, Professor Muhammad Yunus visited the Bangladeshi rural 
village of Jobra and observed how the poor were struggling to escape the poverty trap due to 
their inability to obtain affordable credit. In particular, Yunus attributes the origin of his vision of 
microfinance to an encounter in Jobra with Sufia Begum, a 21-year-old woman who had 
borrowed about 25 cents from moneylenders charging interest rates of approximately 10% per 
day based on the current exchange rates. Ms. Begum used the money she borrowed to make 
bamboo stools that she was then forced to sell back to the moneylender at a price below market 
value for a profit of approximately 2 cents.6  
Growing increasingly frustrated at his inability to help the poor, Yunus pioneered the idea of 
microcredit by providing small loans to poor people in rural villages in Bangladesh. In 1976 he 
experimented by lending small amounts of money at reasonable interest rates to 42 people in 
Jobra. He lent a total of $27 (about 62 cents per borrower) and to his surprise the borrowers paid 
him back in full and on time.7  Then, with the financial assistance of the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD) Yunus extended his lending project nationally and travelled 
from village to village, offering small loans.8 From his experience travelling around Bangladesh, 
Yunus realized that making institutional credit available to the poor could serve as a powerful 
poverty alleviation tool.9 Consequently, he approached traditional banks and proposed that they 
                                                          
5Mainsah, Evaristus, Schuyler R. Heuer, Aprajita Kalra, and Qiulin Zhang. Grameen Bank: Taking Capitalism to the Poor. 
Publication. Columbia Business School, 2004. Web. 
<http://www1.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/848/Grameen_Bank_v04.pdf>.p2.  
6 Mainsah, Evaristus, Schuyler R. Heuer, Aprajita Kalra, and Qiulin Zhang. Grameen Bank: Taking Capitalism to the Poor. p2. 
7 Giridharadas, Anand, and Keith Bradsher. "Microloan Pioneer and His Bank Win Nobel Peace Prize." The New York Times. 
Web. 29 May 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/13/business/14nobelcnd.html?_r=1>. 
8 Mainsah, Evaristus, Schuyler R. Heuer, Aprajita Kalra, and Qiulin Zhang. Grameen Bank: Taking Capitalism to the Poor. p.3. 
9 Yunus, Muhammad. Banker to the Poor: micro-lending and the battle against world poverty. New York: Public Affairs hc. 
p. 46–49. 
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should make uncollateralized loans to poor people in rural villages. Despite Yunus’ conviction 
that the poor would repay their loans if given the opportunity, however, traditional banks were 
not interested in making small loans to them. They asserted that poor borrowers would “never 
sufficiently organize themselves to repay, that proceeds from such loans were too small to cover 
administrative costs, that female borrowers would simply hand over the funds to their husbands 
and that the poor were incapable of successfully managing an added burden of indebtedness.”10  
In 1976 Yunus responded to the challenges posed by conventional banks and rejecting the basic 
methodology of conventional banking, which excluded the poor by classifying them as “not 
creditworthy,” he established the Grameen Bank. Yunus developed a microfinance model using 
rules of lending that were tailored to the poor’s circumstances and extended access to credit to 
the rural poor using this model.11 Today, three decades later, the Grameen Bank’s microcredit 
model serves as an alternative approach to conventional poverty alleviation strategies and it is 
aimed at providing microcredit and organizational input to those who would otherwise be 
excluded from the formal financial system. 
Grameen’s Credit Delivery System 
 
According to Yunus the following are several distinctive features of the Grameen Bank: 
 Targets the Poorest of the Poor and Focuses on Women 
 Group, Collateral-free lending 
 Rural Banking 
 
 
                                                          
10 Mainsah, Evaristus, Schuyler R. Heuer, Aprajita Kalra, and Qiulin Zhang. Grameen Bank: Taking  Capitalism to the Poor. p.3. 
11 Giridharadas, Anand, and Keith Bradsher. "Microloan Pioneer and His Bank Win Nobel Peace Prize."  
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Targets the Poorest of the Poor and Focuses on Women 
According to Professor Yunus, the Grameen Bank targets the poorest of the poor, with a 
particular emphasis on women, who receive 95% of the bank’s loans. The explicit criterion for 
individuals to be eligible for Grameen microcredit loans is “landlessness.” 12  For instance, 
borrowers are eligible to obtain loan if they come from households, “owning less than 0.5 acres 
of cultivable land” or from households in which “total assets do not exceed the value of one acre 
of medium quality, single-cropped land in that area.”13  
 
Group, Collateral-free Lending 
Grameen Bank offers loans for creating self-employment for income-generating activities and 
housing for the poor, as opposed to consumption. It extends credit to the poor to invest in 
productive areas, such as processing and manufacturing, agriculture and forestry, livestock and 
fisheries, services and trade.14  
 
Furthermore, the following are other important features of the Grameen Bank’s lending practices: 
 
 Multiple Loans: Borrowers can take out more than one loan simultaneously. 
 
 Loan Amounts: Loans start at $35 and average $200, depending on the needs of the 
borrowers and their level of credit, which is determined by previous borrowing and their 
repayment record. 
 Repayment: Borrowers pay back their loans in installments (weekly or bi-weekly) and 
pay interest depending on the loan type.  
                                                          
12 Rahman, Aminur. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh.. p.5. 
13 Rahman, Aminur. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh.. p.5. 
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 Interest Rates: There are four interest rates for loans from Grameen Bank: 20% for 
income generating loans, 8% for housing loans, 5% for student loans, and 0% (interest-
free) loans for Struggling Members (beggars). 
 Collateral-Free Lending: The Grameen Bank does not require any collateral against its 
microloans, but instead it provides credit to the poorest of the poor on group basis. Hence, 
it replaces conventional requirement of physical collateral with group responsibility 
where group performance determines continued access to credit.15 
 Group Lending: The Grameen Bank has developed its own credit delivery system to 
overcome problems of asymmetric information and imperfect enforcement by having 
borrowers take out loans in self-selected groups of five rather than individually. 16 The 
purpose of the group lending structure is so that the other borrowers monitor and 
guarantee each other’s debts to the extent that one member defaulting will deprive others 
of future loans. Hence, while there is no group liability in the sense that repayment 
responsibility rests solely on the individual borrowers,  the group lending structure forces 
members to be socially and economically accountable to each other, thereby creating 
pressure among group members to monitor each other and screen out bad borrowers.17 
-Several advantages of the group-lending approach, therefore, are that it uses peer 
pressure to monitor and enforce contracts, it provides an incentive structure for the 
borrowers to repay and it helps screen good borrowers from bad ones.18 
                                                          
15 Khandker, Shahidur R., M. A. Baqui. Khalily, and Zahed H. Khan. Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1995. Print. p.4 
16 Khandker, Shahidur R., M. A. Baqui. Khalily, and Zahed H. Khan. Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability. p.x 
17 Khandker, Shahidur R., M. A. Baqui. Khalily, and Zahed H. Khan. Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability. p.x 
18 Mainsah, Evaristus, Schuyler R. Heuer, Aprajita Kalra, and Qiulin Zhang. Grameen Bank: Taking Capitalism to the Poor. p.5.  
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Rural Banking 
Grameen operates in 81,355 villages across Bangladesh.19 Based on the principle that the bank 
should go to the people, it has developed a client-centered delivery system in which bank 
workers go to the poor to collect their weekly installments and disburse new loans. 20 
Furthermore, to facilitate the expansive provision of microfinance loans across rural Bangladesh, 
the Grameen Bank credit delivery system is decentralized and hierarchical. Its administrative 
structure consists of four tiers - the head office, the zonal offices, the area offices and the 
branches- with a distinctive set of functions for each.21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 "Historical Data Series in USD." Grameen Bank. May 2010. Web. 20 Feb. 2010. <http://www.grameen-
info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=177&Itemid=503>. 
20 Mainsah, Evaristus, Schuyler R. Heuer, Aprajita Kalra, and Qiulin Zhang. Grameen Bank: Taking Capitalism to the Poor. p.5. 
21 Rahman, Aminur. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh.. p.5. 
FIGURE 1.1 The Hierarchical Structure of Grassroots Grameen Bank Micro-Lending 
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As illustrated by Figure 1.1 at the bottom of the hierarchical structure is the Loan Group 
consisting of five individual borrowers per group. The group system represents the first level of 
regulation since loan groups are overseen by a group chairperson who is responsible for 
maintaining group discipline in weekly meetings, conducting weekly transactions with the bank 
workers and proposing loans on behalf of other group members.22 
At the second level of regulation is the Loan Center. Six to eight loan groups form a Loan Center 
and each loan center is overseen by a loan center manager who “visits borrowers regularly to 
monitor loan payments and plays a large role in selecting borrowers, approving lending groups 
and supervising income-generating projects.” 23  
Then, as an added risk-management measure, several loan centers are overseen at the Bank 
Branch level. The branch  is  “the most  important  unit  in Grameen  Bank  operations  since  it 
is  the  field-level office with the most contact with  its member-borrowers  and the basic profit-
making  unit.”24 A typical branch supervises 50-60 centers located in villages within walking 
distance of the branch and it is responsible for group formation, member training and loan 
supervision.25  Furthermore, each of the Grameen Bank’s 2562 branches is run by a branch 
manager and several center managers.  
Finally, several branch offices are supervised by an area manager and program officer at the area 
office and they have the ultimate authority to make decisions about individual loans.  
 
                                                          
22 Rahman, Aminur. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh.. p.5. 
23 Rahman, Aminur. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh.. p.5. 
24 Rahman, Aminur. Women and Microcredit in Rural Bangladesh.. p.5. 
25Khandke, Shahidur, Baqui Khalily, and Zahed Khan. Is the Grameen Bank Sustainable? p. 6.  
 Moreno, 14 
 Strategy, Risk Management, Growth and Compensation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1.2. Summary of Grameen Bank’s Strategy, Risk Management, Growth and Compensation 
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Chapter 2: Financial Successes of the Grameen Bank 
 
The Grameen Bank’s successes and limitations can be measured in terms of both social and 
financial standards. Financially, according to the Grameen Bank’s financial statements since 
2002 the Grameen Bank has experienced significant institutional, outreach and loan 
disbursement growth.  
Institutional Growth  
 
As illustrated by Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 Grameen experienced high institutional growth since 
2002. In particular, there has been a significant increase in the Grameen Bank’s number of 
employees, number of offices and total assets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Source- Grameen Bank 
 Moreno, 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3:  Source- Grameen Bank 
Bank 
Figure 2.2 Source- Grameen Bank 
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Outreach Growth  
The Grameen Bank’s has also experienced significant outreach growth since 2002.26 As shown 
by Figure 2.4 there has been growth in the number of members, the number of active borrowers, 
the average loan balance per borrower and the percent of women members. As Figure 2.4 
illustrates, as of 2009 the total borrowers of the bank were 7.97 million and 97% of those are 
women. This indicates that the number of borrowers has more than doubled since 2002, when the 
bank had only 2.08 million members. Similar growth can also be observed in the number of 
branches since as of 2009 the bank had 2,562 branches, which is also almost twice the 1,178 
branches it had in 2002. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 Chen Greg, Rasmussen Stephen, and Reille Xavier. Growth and Vulnerabilities in Microfinance. Rep. CGAP, Feb. 2010. Web. 
14 July 2010. <http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.42393/FN61.pdf>. 
FIGURE 2.4 Grameen Bank’s Outreach Growth, 2002-2009 
Source- Grameen Bank 
Bank 
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Loan Portfolio Growth 
 
Finally, since 2002 the Grameen Bank has also seen growth in its loan portfolio. According to 
Figure 2.5 below there has been growth in the principal amount of loans disbursed, the number 
of loans disbursed, the gross total of loan outstanding, the current performing loans and the 
portfolio growth rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Grameen Bank’s institutional, outreach and loan portfolio growth since 2002 shows that it 
has been successful at creating more opportunities for the rural poor to borrow money across 
Bangladesh. By expanding the number of active borrowers, employees, branches, and loans 
disbursed, the Grameen Bank has been able to expand access to credit and to include millions 
FIGURE 2.5 Grameen Bank’s Loan Portfolio Growth, 2002-2009 
Source- Grameen Bank 
Bank 
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more poor people into the financial system. 27  Maintaining such growth in an efficient and 
financially viable way, therefore, will be instrumental for supporting the Grameen Bank’s goal to 
expand the provision of microfinance across Bangladesh as a poverty alleviation strategy in the 
future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 Chen Greg, Rasmussen Stephen, and Reille Xavier. Growth and Vulnerabilities in Microfinance.  
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Chapter 3: Financial Limitations of the Grameen Bank 
Decreasing Loan Recovery Rates and Increasing Delinquency  
 
In addition to its high institutional, outreach and loan portfolio growth one of the most important 
financial successes of the Grameen Bank has been its high repayment rate of 98%. The Grameen 
Bank has long prided itself on maintaining repayment rates, which are considerably higher than 
those of mainstream lenders.  
In recent years, however, the accuracy of these figures has been disputed and critics have argued 
that the bank’s repayment rate has been declining and is in fact lower than 98%. Pearl and 
Phillips, for instance, have criticized the Grameen Bank's financial reporting procedures and 
suggested that recent repayment problems are being masked by non-standard accounting 
practices. 28  Likewise, Associate Professor of Economics and Public Policy at New York 
University Jonathan J. Murdoch has also maintained that the percentage of the Grameen Bank’s 
current loan portfolio that is actually at risk is greater than has been reported. According to 
Murdoch, “Grameen’s repayment rates have never been as good as they have claimed…Because 
Grameen has been so well-known, nobody has wanted to risk undermining the reputation of the 
idea” 29  
Despite such criticisms against the Grameen Bank’s loose accounting standards and slow 
disclosure, recent data posted by the Grameen Bank supports criticisms that there has been a 
trend towards deteriorating repayment rates and increasing delinquency.  
 
 
                                                          
28  Pearl, Daniel, and Michael M. Phillips. "Grameen Bank, Which Pioneered Loans For the Poor, Has Hit a Repayment Snag." 
The Wall Street Journal. 27 Nov. 2001. Web. 20 Apr. 2010. 
<http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/pearl112701.htm>. 
29 Pearl, Daniel, and Michael M. Phillips. "Grameen Bank, Which Pioneered Loans For the Poor, Has Hit a Repayment Snag." 
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According to the Grameen Bank’s financial data since 2002: 
 The percentage of borrowers not repaying their loans on time has increased 
  Loan collection rates have decreased in the short and long term 
  Delinquency has increased 
Defaulting Borrowers 
Figure 3.1 shows an approximate 1.50% increase over the last seven years in the percentage of 
outstanding borrowers missing 5 to 9 consecutive loans (1-2 months of weekly installments) 
from 0.10% in June 2002 to 1.51% in December 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Loan Collection Rate 
Similarly, as Figure 3.2 illustrates the Grameen Bank has been experiencing recurring difficulties 
in collecting its loans particularly since December 2003. According to the graph there has been a 
decline in the on-time loan collection rate (% of amounts due actually paid) from nearly 99% in 
2003 to the current 96.83%, marking a decrease of 2.17%.  
 
Figure 3.1:  Source- Grameen Bank 
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Short and Long Run Loan Collection Rates 
Likewise, when considering longer term difficulties, such as total amounts owed by people who 
have not only missed 5-9 consecutive payments but missed 10 or more payments, similar trends 
towards declining on-time repayment are evident since 2002.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2:  Source- Grameen Bank Which Pioneered Loans for the Poor Has Hit a Repayment Snag 
Figure 3.3:  Source- Grameen Bank Which Pioneered Loans for the Poor Has Hit a Repayment Snag 
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In Figure 3.3 the % of amounts due in a month not paid is a non-recovery rate or the inverse of 
the values of Figure 3.2 from a collection to a non-collection standpoint; therefore, it shows the 
same trend as Figure 3.2 shows of decreasing on-time collection rates since 2002. Likewise, the 
two added indicators of the % of amounts outstanding owed by those who have missed 5-9 
consecutive payments and 10 or more consecutive payments also show a similar trend towards 
decreasing on-time collection rates for longer periods of time.30 
Delinquency  
 
Finally, although the definition of repayment rate varies widely over microfinance institutions, in 
the microfinance industry 30 days is a common breakpoint marking when a loan becomes 
delinquent; hence, Portfolio at Risk (PAR) 30 is considered to be a standard international 
measures of portfolio quality since it measures the portion of a portfolio which is deemed at risk 
because payments are more than 30 days past due. 31 
According to Figure 3.4 there has been a rise in delinquency for the Grameen Bank’s core credit 
product, the basic loan, and for its flexible loans since 2002 due to the fact that there has been a 
rise in its Portfolio at Risk/30 days (Par 30) levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30  "Grameen Bank, Which Pioneered Loans For the Poor, Has Hit a Repayment Snag." Center for Global Development. 9 Feb. 
2010. Web. 20 Mar. 2010. <http://blogs.cgdev.org/open_book/2010/02/grameen-bank-which-pioneered-loans-for-the-poor-has-
hit-a-repayment-snag.php>. 
31 Morduch, Jonathan. "The Role of Subsidies in Microfinance: Evidence from the Grameen Bank."  
 Moreno, 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although there has been a rise in the Grameen’s PAR 30 levels since 2002, this increase in 
PAR30 does not necessarily signal that the Grameen Bank is in a serious repayment crisis. 32 In 
fact, a microfinance institution is considered to be in a serious crisis when its PAR 30 is above 5 
or 10%.33  This is supported by a study from 2003 to 2008 which shows that “a random MFI of 
over US$1 million in assets had a 1–5% chance of failing during a three-year period, an MFI that 
reported PAR30 >5% had a 6–10% chance of failure, while one with PAR30 >10% would fail 
                                                          
32 Reille, Xavier, Christoph Kneiding, Daniel Rozas, and Nick O’Donohoe. "All Eyes on Asset Quality: Microfinance Global 
Valuation Survey 2010." CGAP, Mar. 2010. Web. 14 June 2010. <http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.9.42531/>. 
33 "Financial Crisis Glossary – a Guide to the Buzzwords of the Crisis." CGAP, 1 Nov. 2008. Web. 15 July 2010. 
<http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.11.12053/>. 
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10–15% of the time.” 34  Hence, since the Grameen Bank’s PAR 30 levels have remained 
consistently below the 5% threshold, the recent increase in PAR 30 is currently only a red flag 
indicator that a repayment crisis could occur in the future if these levels are permitted to rise 
further. 
In addition, comparative data also shows that, despite the recent increase in its PAR 30 levels, 
the Grameen Bank has also been performing well relative to its main competitors BRAC and 
ASA. As Figure 3.5 illustrates since 2004 the Grameen Bank’s PAR 30 levels have been 
relatively lower than those of BRAC and ASA.35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 Reille, Xavier, Christoph Kneiding, Daniel Rozas, and Nick O’Donohoe. "All Eyes on Asset Quality: Microfinance Global 
Valuation Survey 2010." 
35 Reille, Xavier, Christoph Kneiding, Daniel Rozas, and Nick O’Donohoe. "All Eyes on Asset Quality: Microfinance Global 
Valuation Survey 2010." 
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Although the accuracy of this comparison is ultimately dependent on the accuracy with which 
each of these institutions have measured and reported their overdue portfolios, according to 
available data from the Grameen Bank and Mix Market, the Grameen Bank’s PAR 30 levels 
have remained low relative to its competitors since 2004.36  
Finally, the Grameen Bank has also been performing comparably to Syminvest’s 50 major 
investible microfinance institutions. As Figure 3.6 shows, much like the Grameen Bank, the 
average PAR 30 of the SYM 50 investible microfinance institutions has also not significantly 
exceeded the 5% threshold in recent years.37 
 
 
 
 
 
The Grameen Bank, therefore, is not currently in a serious repayment crisis since its PAR 30 
levels are below 5%, they are relatively lower than its main competitors BRAC and ASA and 
                                                          
36 Reille, Xavier, Christoph Kneiding, Daniel Rozas, and Nick O’Donohoe. "All Eyes on Asset Quality: Microfinance Global 
Valuation Survey 2010." 
37 "Market - Benchmarks (Sym50)." SymInvest - Microfinance Investment Intelligence. Web. 11 July 2010. 
<http://www.syminvest.com/microfinance-institution/market>. 
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they are comparable to the average PAR 30 of the SYM50 investible microfinance institutions. 
However, precautions should nevertheless be taken to avoid more serious financial problems in 
the future particularly since higher delinquency could make it impossible for the Grameen Bank 
to be financially sustainable in the long run. 
Possible Causes of the Decreasing Recovery Rates and Increasing Delinquency  
 
To prevent the decreasing recovery rates and increasing delinquency from leading to a serious 
repayment crisis in the future it is important to consider possible causes of the recent trends. 
Although there are numerous possible explanations, in the following section multiple borrowing, 
over borrowing, adverse selection and the economy will be examined in greater detail as possible 
contributing factors to the Grameen Bank’s decreasing recovery rates and increasing delinquency 
since 2002. 
Adverse Selection 
 
The problem of adverse selection arises in microfinance when microfinance institutions are 
unable to distinguish between ‘risky’ and ‘safe’ borrowers prior to providing the loans.38 In the 
contractual relationship between the Grameen Bank and potential borrowers, therefore, there is 
an adverse selection risk because the Grameen Bank is not able to defer to usual measures of risk 
assessment, such as collateral or credit ratings to determine whether borrowers are ‘risky’ or 
‘safe.’39 
                                                          
38Borge, Tore, and Oscar Olsen. The Missing Link in Microfinance. Rep. Studies in Development Management, 2007. Web. 15 
June 2010. 
<http://www.bi.no/OsloFiles/MICRO/2007/Publications/Micro%20Paper%20nr%202%20The%20Missing%20Link%20online%
20publication.pdf>. p.9. 
39Borge, Tore, and Oscar Olsen. The Missing Link in Microfinance. p.9. 
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The group lending structure of the Grameen Bank, however, has diminished the bank’s role in 
controlling for such adverse selection problems because it has “triggered a peer selection effect 
among borrowers who know each other and often have more information about their peers 
because they belong to the same small rural communities.”40 This is the case because since group 
lending creates joint liability, it also induces borrowers who have perfect information about each 
other to choose partners of the same type.41 Consequently, safe borrowers have formed groups 
with other safe borrowers, leaving the risky borrowers to form their own groups.42  
Although the Grameen Bank’s group lending structure has reduced the possibility of adverse 
selection problems, it is probable that these adverse selection problems have not been fully 
corrected as the Grameen Bank has continued to expand. For instance, it is probable that they 
have not been completely corrected by the Grameen Bank’s staff since rapid growth typically 
requires MFIs to assign staff more quickly into responsible positions, sometimes resulting in less 
care being taken in recruitment, training, and preparation. 43 Likewise, it is also probable that 
Grameen’s adverse selection problems may not have been completely self-corrected by 
borrowers as the number of Grameen borrowers has increased since risky borrowers are more 
likely to have joined groups with other borrowers.  
As a result, it is possible that while expanding the bank has attracted a greater number of 
inherently risky borrowers, such as borrowers who are less driven, more risk seeking, poorly 
disciplined, less entrepreneurial or have lower quality projects. This is supported by the fact that 
as Figures 3.2 and 2.4 illustrate since 2002 there has been an increase in the number of Grameen 
                                                          
40Borge, Tore, and Oscar Olsen. The Missing Link in Microfinance. p.9. 
41 Borge, Tore, and Oscar Olsen. The Missing Link in Microfinance. p.9. 
42Borge, Tore, and Oscar Olsen. The Missing Link in Microfinance. p.9. 
43 Chen, Greg, Rasmussen Stephen, and Reille Xavier. Growth and Vulnerabilities in Microfinance. 
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members and employees at the same time that there has also been a decrease in the loan 
collection rate. Given this positive correlation, therefore, it is possible that the rise in 
delinquency could be related to the fact that the Grameen Bank has been providing loans to 
riskier borrowers since 2002. 
Concentrated Market Competition and Multiple Borrowing 
 
The rise in delinquency at the Grameen Bank could also be attributed to an increase in multiple 
borrowing. The likelihood that clients borrow from more than one MFI has increased due to the 
fact that currently over 650 microcreditors operate in Bangladesh.44 Furthermore, since there is 
no national identification system in Bangladesh, creditors have been unable to share information 
to track how much debt people are juggling, as creditors in developed countries do through credit 
bureaus.45 As a result of this rise in competition and lack of transparency in terms of disbursing 
credit, microfinance borrowers have been able to take loans from multiple sources to smooth 
their cashflows.  
According to Pearl and Phillips, the increasing competition from other microcredit institutions 
has not only resulted in a problem with overlapping loans from multiple institutions, but it has 
also created pressure for borrowers to maintain greater self-discipline.46 Despite this pressure, 
however, they suggest that multiple borrowing has in fact resulted in an erosion of credit 
discipline over the past several years because borrowers that have taken multiple loans have 
strived to maintain their regular repayment schedule through a process of loan recycling and 
                                                          
44 Chen, Greg, Rasmussen Stephen, and Reille Xavier. Growth and Vulnerabilities in Microfinance. 
45 "Grameen Bank, Which Pioneered Loans For the Poor, Has Hit a Repayment Snag." 
46 "Grameen Bank, Which Pioneered Loans For the Poor, Has Hit a Repayment Snag." 
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cross-financing, despite not having the ability to repay their loans.47 Moreover, since borrowers 
have been able to raise their total borrowings from multiple sources, the Grameen Bank’s 
practice of gradually raising loan sizes to ensure borrowers remain within their repayment limits 
has become less useful as a risk management tool.48 Instead, by taking on debt from multiple 
sources, borrowers have increased their liability and the risk of becoming trapped in a cycle of 
debt.  
Moreover, the increased competition and multiple borrowing observed in recent years has also 
created pressure for the Grameen Bank to remain competitive and to impose effective discipline 
on borrowers. However, since borrowers have been able to access loans from several MFIs or 
alternate between loans, they have become less dependent on the Grameen Bank and thus less 
constrained by its loan repayment schedules. Consequently, they have been able to default and 
still retain their borrowing relationship with other MFIs and this has in turn diminished their 
incentive to repay and made late payments more likely.49 
Another possible explanation for the decreasing loan collection rate, therefore, could also be the 
fact that Bangladeshis are currently juggling loans from several microcreditors at once and/or 
borrowing more money than they can repay. If this is the case, in the future it will be critical to 
establish a credit bureau in order to improve credit risk management and prevent a more 
expansive erosion of credit discipline.50 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 "Grameen Bank, Which Pioneered Loans For the Poor, Has Hit a Repayment Snag." 
48 Chen, Greg, Rasmussen Stephen, and Reille Xavier. Growth and Vulnerabilities in Microfinance. 
49 Chen, Greg, Rasmussen Stephen, and Reille Xavier. Growth and Vulnerabilities in Microfinance. 
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Over Borrowing 
 
Similarly, it is also possible that the increasing delinquency and percentage of borrowers 
defaulting can be due to the fact that borrowers are currently borrowing larger total amounts 
from the Grameen Bank than they can repay.  As illustrated by the Figure 4.2 the amount of 
outstanding credit per Grameen Bank member has increased from 5160 taka in 2002 to 
approximately 7300 taka in 2010, which is also the same time period during in which the rise in 
delinquency took place:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This increase in total amount borrowed therefore makes it more likely that some clients are 
borrowing amounts beyond their means.51 Given the fact that there is also a positive correlation 
between the rise in delinquency by Grameen borrowers and the increase in outstanding credit per 
                                                          
51 Chen, Greg, Rasmussen Stephen, and Reille Xavier. Growth and Vulnerabilities in Microfinance. 
 
Figure 3.7:  Source- Grameen Bank Which Pioneered Loans for the Poor Has Hit a Repayment Snag 
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Grameen Bank member, therefore, over borrowing could also be another possible explanation for 
the recent rise in delinquency and decline in repayment rates since 2002. 
Economy of Bangladesh  
 
Finally, it is also possible that the economy of Bangladesh and the effects of the global financial 
crisis have indirectly inhibited Grameen member’s ability to repay their loans since there was a 
peak in delinquency during 2008 and 2009. According to macroeconomic indicators for the fiscal 
years of 2008 and 2009, however, problems in the economy did not cause the rise in delinquency 
because macroeconomic data shows that the economy of Bangladesh weathered the global 
economic crisis well and that instead it has been growing during the past years. In fact, in FY09 
annual GDP growth still reached a healthy 5.9% GDP growth because limited integration with 
the world economy helped shield Bangladesh from the negative effects of the global economic 
crisis.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
52 Bangladesh Economic Update September 2009. Rep. World Bank, Sept. 2009. Web. 22 May 2010. 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BANGLADESHEXTN/Resources/295759-1240185591585/6038321-
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Figure 3.8:  Source- Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 
 Moreno, 33 
Furthermore, although annual GDP growth in FY09 decelerated slightly from the 6.2% growth in 
FY08, the 5.9% GDP growth in FY09 was nevertheless considerably higher than in FY02 when 
GDP growth was approximately 4%.53 This is important because it shows that there has been 
healthy economic growth in Bangladesh during 2002-2008, the same years that delinquency has 
increased at the Grameen Bank. Hence, it is likely that external macroeconomic factors did not 
directly contribute to the recent rise in delinquency and decline in repayment rates since 2002. 
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Chapter 4: Social Successes and Limitations of the Grameen Bank 
 
In terms of social standards the Grameen Bank has also had significant successes and limitations. 
Sixteen Decisions 
 
Beginning in 1984, the Sixteen Decisions was introduced by the Grameen Bank as a social 
development program “to imbue members with discipline, unity and hard work to improve their 
living standards.”54 The Grameen Bank developed the Sixteen Decisions in order to promote 
social and financial discipline among the rural poor.55 At every branch of Grameen Bank the 
borrowers recite the Sixteen Decisions and they pledge to follow them. As illustrated by Figure 
4.1 these decisions include certain codes of conduct that members are encouraged to follow in 
their daily life, such as the production of fruits and vegetables in kitchen gardens, investment for 
improvement of housing and education of children, use of latrines and safe drinking water for 
better health, and rejection of dowry in marriages.56  
 According to the Grameen Bank, the implementation of the Sixteen Decisions has been 
successful because it has encouraged Grameen borrowers to adopt positive social habits. For 
instance, the Grameen Bank states that since the Sixteen Decisions were implemented almost all 
Grameen borrowers have their school-age children enrolled in regular classes and this in turn has 
helped bring about social change and educate the next generation. 
Figure 4.1 presents a list of the Grameen Bank’s Sixteen Decisions. 
 
                                                          
54 Hossain, Mahabub. Credit for the Alleviation of Rural Poverty: The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, Research Report No. 55 
(Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, 1988). 
55 Khandker, Shahidur R., M. A. Baqui. Khalily, and Zahed H. Khan. Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability.  
 
56 Hossain, Mahabub. Credit for the Alleviation of Rural Poverty: The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.  
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Sixteen Decisions of the Grameen Bank 
1. We shall follow and advance the four principles of Grameen Bank: 
Discipline, Unity, Courage and Hard work – in all walks of our lives.  
2. Prosperity we shall bring to our families.  
3. We shall not live in dilapidated houses. We shall repair our houses and work 
towards constructing new houses at the earliest. 
4. We shall grow vegetables all the year round. We shall eat plenty of them 
and sell the surplus.  
5. During the plantation seasons, we shall plant as many seedlings as possible.  
6. We shall plan to keep our families small. We shall minimize our 
expenditures. We shall look after our health.  
7. We shall educate our children and ensure that they can earn to pay for their 
education.  
8. We shall always keep our children and the environment clean.  
9. We shall build and use pit-latrines.  
10. We shall drink water from tube wells. If it is not available, we shall boil 
water or use alum.  
11. We shall not take any dowry at our sons' weddings; neither shall we give 
any dowry at our daughter's wedding. We shall keep our centre free from 
the curse of dowry. We shall not practice child marriage.  
12. We shall not inflict any injustice on anyone; neither shall we allow anyone 
to do so.  
13. We shall collectively undertake bigger investments for higher incomes.  
14. We shall always be ready to help each other. If anyone is in difficulty, we 
shall all help him or her.  
15. If we come to know of any breach of discipline in any centre, we shall all go 
there and help restore discipline.  
16. We shall take part in all social activities collectively. 
 
 
Limitations 
Despite claims by proponents about the benefits of the Sixteen Decisions, however, opponents of 
this policy claim that it forces families and borrowers to abide by the rules and regulations set 
forth by the bank. Furthermore, some have gone as far as to say that the mandatory changes in 
lifestyle that the Grameen Bank imposes through the Sixteen Decisions “are tantamount to a 
cult’s demands.” 57 
                                                          
57 Tucker, J. (1995). The micro-credit cult. The Free Market. Retrieved February 8, 2007. 
http://www.mises.org/freemarket_detail.asp?control=215&sortorder=articledate. 
Figure 4.1:  Source- Grameen Bank 
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Lending to Women  
 
Historically, women have been neglected by development projects and removed from the growth 
and development process. 58  The Grameen Bank, however, has actively promoted their 
membership and deliberately targeted women, recognizing that “their participation in social 
development is necessary for economic development because of their primary role in providing 
health, education and nutrition to the family members.”59 
By providing women with access to credit the Grameen Bank has helped women to initiate 
income-earning activities, marking a significant step towards promoting equity between men and 
women and establishing gender justice. 60  Moreover, as a consequence of their increased 
economic opportunities, women have been able to gain authority and respect from their spouses 
and communities. 61  Lending to them, therefore, has not only had positive effects on their 
economic participation and earnings, but it has also had a positive effect on their marital 
decision-making power and their ability to no longer be financially powerless in their families 
and communities 62  
In addition, the Grameen Bank has also helped poor women acquire self-esteem by promoting 
entrepreneurialism. Their extra income has also brought about better living conditions for other 
family members, especially their children.63 In fact, women are now able to “take a more active 
role in their children’s futures by providing their children with better educational opportunities 
                                                          
58 Khandker, Shahidur R., M. A. Baqui. Khalily, and Zahed H. Khan. Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability. p.12 
59 Khandker, Shahidur R., M. A. Baqui. Khalily, and Zahed H. Khan. Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability. p.12 
60 Khandker, Shahidur R., M. A. Baqui. Khalily, and Zahed H. Khan. Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability. p.xii 
61 Khandker, Shahidur R., M. A. Baqui. Khalily, and Zahed H. Khan. Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability. p.12 
62 Khandker, Shahidur R., M. A. Baqui. Khalily, and Zahed H. Khan. Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability. p.12 
63 Khandker, Shahidur R., M. A. Baqui. Khalily, and Zahed H. Khan. Grameen Bank: Performance and Sustainability. p.xii 
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and conveying a positive image about women to their daughters.” 64 Hence, advocates of the 
Grameen Bank suggest that it has promoted social justice by redressing Bangladesh’s history of 
depriving women access to credit and empowering poor people who had previously been 
disfranchised.65 
 
Limitations 
 
Contrary to claims about the role of the Grameen Bank in promoting social justice and 
empowerment, critics view the Grameen Bank’s policies and services as disempowering to 
women. They claim that since the Grameen Bank targets its loans to women, some husbands 
who have been excluded, have forced their wives to sign up for loans, only to appropriate the 
funds from them.66 They suggest that most women borrowers are not the direct benefactors of the 
credit extended to them, but instead they “are mediators between male household members and 
the bank.”67 Hence, they indicate that the provision of loans to women does not empower them 
because “the lending mechanism can operate under the prevailing patriarchal norms of the 
village society and the positional vulnerability of women.”68 Instead, they contend that rather 
than empowering women, the Grameen Bank has inaugurated, ‘‘new forms of domination over 
women in society’69  
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Other Social Effects 
 
Finally, according to numerous studies, the following are several other social effects that the 
Grameen Bank has had on its borrowers, their families and rural villages in Bangladesh. 
• Higher Incomes- The incomes of Grameen members are approximately 43% higher than 
incomes of control groups in nonprogram villages and 28% higher than nonmembers in Grameen 
villages. Grameen members are also able to rely more on savings and their own funds to cope 
with crises rather than to borrow from moneylenders.70 
• Household consumption- Female clients have increased household consumption by 18 takas for 
every 100 takas borrowed.71 
•Children Education- The children of Grameen borrowers compared to children of non-members 
show higher levels of schooling. For instance, almost all girls in Grameen households have had 
some schooling, compared to 60% of girls in non-client households. Furthermore, the schooling 
rate is significantly higher for boys given that 81% of boys in client households have received 
some schooling, compared to 54% in non-client households.72 
•Contraception- Grameen clients show a higher rate of contraceptive use (59%) than non-clients 
(43%). This has been attributed to clients’ increased awareness of contraceptive programs.73 
                                                          
70 Hossain, Mahabub. Credit for the Alleviation of Rural Poverty: The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. 
71 Shahidur Khandker, Fighting Poverty with Microcredit: Experience in Bangladesh (New York: Oxford 
University Press, Inc., 1998). 
 
72  "What Do We Know about the Impact of Microfinance?" CGAP. Web. 11 July 2010. 
<http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.1306>. 
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•Environment- Grameen Shakti is a non-profit company, part of the Grameen family, which has 
distributed clean energy products in remote areas of Bangladesh. As of December 2006, it has 
installed 77,000 solar home systems and 500 biogas plants.74 
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Conclusion: The Grameen Bank and the Microfinance Movement 
 
Since the Grameen Bank was established in 1976 it has demonstrated the potential of 
microfinance as an important liberating force and instrument in the struggle against poverty.  By 
expanding access to credit to poor households across rural Bangladesh, the Grameen Bank has 
rejected the basic methodology of conventional banking and developed a paradigm using rules of 
lending that are tailored to help the rural poor. Furthermore, despite its limitations, the Grameen 
Bank has defied its critic’s expectations and proven to be a financially and socially successful 
institution.  
From a financial standpoint, the Grameen Bank has successfully experienced high institutional, 
outreach and loan portfolio growth since 2002. By expanding the number of active borrowers, 
employees, branches, and loans disbursed it has been able to increase access to credit across rural 
Bangladesh, to include millions more poor people into the financial system and to create more 
self-employment opportunities for them.75 Furthermore, although there has been a decrease in the 
Grameen Bank’s recovery rates and increase in delinquency since 2002, according to its PAR 30 
levels, the standard international measure of portfolio at risk, currently the Grameen Bank is not 
in a serious repayment crisis. Rather, it is performing comparably to the SYM50 investible 
microfinance institutions and relatively better than its main competitors BRAC and ASA.  
From a social impact standpoint, the Grameen Bank has also been successful. Although 
criticisms have emerged that the bank’s growth has contributed to the recent rise in delinquency, 
even if this is the case the benefits of helping a larger number of poor borrowers have 
outweighed the costs of higher delinquency particularly since the bank’s provision of credit has 
had significant social benefits for its borrowers. For instance, by providing women with access to 
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credit, the Grameen Bank has helped women initiate income-earning activities, become 
financially independent and gain authority and respect from their spouses and communities; thus 
marking a significant step towards establishing gender justice. In addition, by providing the rural 
poor with an opportunity to invest in self-employment microenterprise actives, it has also helped 
borrowers reduce their vulnerability to crises and become empowered. Likewise, other important 
social effects include higher incomes, higher household consumption, increased children 
education, greater contraception use, among others.  
Finally, in addition to being socially and financially successful as an institution, the Grameen 
Bank has also been successful as a key figure that has led to the emergence and development of 
the microfinance movement. Although Grameen-like microfinance may not be a panacea for 
global poverty alleviation, given its limitations, the success of the Grameen Bank has 
nevertheless demonstrated that microfinance can be an effective development tool. As a result, in 
recent years microfinance has emerged as a new approach to poverty alleviation and social 
change, it has gained widespread international recognition and it has been incorporated into 
mainstream development agendas. Ultimately, therefore, the Grameen Bank’s success has not 
only extended to its work as an independent microfinance institution, but also as the founder of 
the microfinance movement, which has significantly improved the lives of millions of poor 
people over the past three decades and changed the development discourse around the world.  
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